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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Brummett appeals from the summary dismissal of his post-
conviction petition. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Union Pacific railroad tracks near 11 th Avenue North, Nampa are 
protected by a chainlink fence with barbed wire on top. (R., Vol. II, p. 172 
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-20).) Union Pacific also posted a large no trespassing 
sign. (Id.) Officer Davis saw Brummett walking on the railroad tracks. (R., Vol. I, 
p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172.) Brummett was wearing headphones. (R., Vol. II, p. 
172 (7 /10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 21 - p. 7, L. 6).) Officer Davis repeatedly yelled to get 
Brummett's attention, but he ignored Officer Davis. (Id.) 
Only after Officer Davis raised his voice as loud as he could, did 
Brummett walk over to the chain link fence to talk to Officer Davis. (Id.) Officer 
Davis told Brummett that he was on private property and he needed Brummett to 
come down to where Brummett could cross the fence and they could talk. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 7, L. 7 - p. 8, L. 12).) Brummett eventually started 
walking in the direction Officer Davis indicated. (Id.) 
Brummett then walked out into the middle of the tracks and just stopped. 
(Id.) Officer Davis kept yelling at him, but Brummett just ignored him. (Id.) 
Officer Davis started to climb over the fence. (R., Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 
8, Ls. 3-12).) Brummett took off running. (Id.) Brummett ran towards a slow 
moving train and climbed through the middle of two railroad cars. (R., Vol. I, p. 
1 
27.) The train stopped just in time for Officer Davis to go through the same two 
railroad cars. (Id.) Brummett continued to run, but eventually tripped and fell. 
(Id.) He got up and refused Officer Davis' commands to get on the ground. (Id.) 
Officer Davis tackled Brummett and put him in handcuffs. (Id.) During a brief 
pat-down, Officer Davis found marijuana in Brummett's left front pants pocket. 
(R., Vol. I, pp. 27-28.) Before Officer Davis put Brummett in the patrol car he 
also found a hypodermic needle in his jacket pocket and a spoon with white 
crystal residue. (R., Vol. I, p. 28; Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L. 
8).) The white crystal residue tested positive for methamphetamine. (R., Vol. I, 
p. 28; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L. 8).) 
After Brummett was advised of his Miranda rights, Brummett admitted that 
the methamphetamine and marijuana were his. (R., Vol. II, p. 107.) Brummett 
said he ran from Officer Davis because he thought Officer Davis would search 
him and find the marijuana. (Id.) Union Pacific Rail Road advised Officer Davis 
that Brummett would have had to climb the fence to get onto their railroad tracks 
at that location. (Id.) The state charged Brummett with possession of 
methamphetamine, trespass, possession of paraphernalia, resisting and 
obstructing and possession of marijuana. (R., Vol. II, pp. 106, 134-136.) 
After a preliminary hearing, Brummett was bound over to district court. 
(R., Vol. 11, pp. 167, 170-178.) The state added a Persistent Violator 
enchantment. (R., Vol. II, pp. 184-185.) Brummett's counsel sent him a letter 
explaining that a motion to suppress was not warranted because Brummett ran 
from police. (R., Vol. I, p. 37.) Brummett's counsel provided Brummett with 
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copies of the police report and applicable case law. (Id.) The letter also urged 
Brummett to consider the state's plea offer, because the state offered to dismiss 
the persistent violator enhancement. (Id.) Brummett's counsel also sent him a 
second letter explaining that he would not file a motion to dismiss because such 
a motion would be frivolous. (R., Vol. I, p. 35.) 
Brummett agreed to plead guilty to felony possession of 
methamphetamine. (R., Vol. II, p. 197.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the 
state dismissed the misdemeanors - trespass, resist and obstruct, 
paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana - and dismissed the persistent 
violator enhancement. (R., Vol. II, pp. 202-207.) The district court sentenced 
Brummett to seven years with three years fixed. (R., Vol. II, pp. 208-210.) The 
district court ordered the sentence to run concurrent with Brummett's Ada County 
sentence. (Id.) 
Brummett filed a Petition and Affidavit For Post Conviction Relief. (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 3-55.) The district court appointed post-conviction counsel. (R., Vol. 
I, pp. 62-64, 97-98.) The state filed an Answer. (R., Vol. I, pp. 71-73.) 
The district court entered an Order of Conditional Dismissal. (R., Vol. II, 
p. 265-274.) The Order of Conditional Dismissal gave Brummett notice of the 
court's intent to dismiss and provided its reasons for the dismissal. (See R., Vol. 
II, pp. 265-27 4.) In part, the district court gave notice that Brummett failed to 
provide admissible evidence that his counsel was ineffective for declining to file a 
motion to suppress based upon the claim that the officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion that Brummett was trespassing. (R., Vol. II, pp. 271-272.) The district 
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court gave Brummett 20 days to respond. (R., Vol. II, p. 273.) Brummett moved 
for additional time to respond and the district court granted the motion. (R., Vol. 
II, pp. 275-278.) Brummett filed an Objection to the Order of Conditional 
Dismissal. (R., Vol. II, pp. 279-284.) Brummett argued that he was not 
trespassing because there was an opening in the fence and he did not see the 
no trespassing signs. (R., Vol. II, p. 283.) 
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order of 
Dismissal. (R., Vol. II, pp. 285-289.) The district court rejected Brummett's 
argument and held that Officer Davis "had a reasonable suspicion that 
[Brummett] was committing criminal activity, particularly when [Brummett] ran 
from police." (R., Vol. II, pp. 287-288.) The district court also found that that 
motion to suppress would have been denied because the officer "acted 
reasonably within his community caretaking function to make sure that 
[Brummett] was off of the railroad tracks because trains frequently pass along 
the same tracks that [Brummett] was walking on." (R., Vol. II, p. 288.) In 
conclusion the district court held: 
This Court finds that [Brummett's] claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel fails because there was no showing that his attorney's 
performance was deficient and because [Brummett] cannot show a 
reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would likely have 
succeeded, thus counsel's failure to pursue the motion was not 
prejudicial to [Brummett's] case. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 288.) The district court dismissed Brummett's post-conviction 
petition. (R., Vol. II, p. 290.) Brummett timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp. 292-
295.) 
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ISSUE 
Brummett states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Brummett's 
petition without giving notice as required by I.C. § 19-4906(b)? 
2. Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of 
counsel because the community caretaker exception to the Fourth 
Amendment allows police to chase, tackle, arrest, and search a person 
who, while near railroad tracks, is on a public street and in no apparent 
danger of being injured by a train or anything else and presents no threat 
to safe railroad operations? U.S. Const. Amends 4, 6, and 14; Idaho 
Const. Art. I, §17. 
3. Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of 
counsel because the fact that he ran from the police, with nothing more, 
was sufficient to justify tackling, arresting and searching him? U.S. Const. 
Amends 4, 6, and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, §17 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Brummett failed to show the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his post-conviction petition? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Brummett Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Summarily 
Dismissed His Post-Conviction Petition 
A Introduction 
On appeal Brummett argues the district court failed to give adequate 
notice of the reasons for the summary dismissal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) 
Specifically, Brummett argues that the district court did not give him adequate 
notice of the "community caretaking" reason for dismissal. (Id.) However, the 
primary reason the district court dismissed his petition was that a motion to 
suppress would have failed because Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion to 
believe Brummett was engaged in criminal activity. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 265-274, 
285-289.) Brummett does not challenge this notice. 
Brummett also argues that his criminal counsel was ineffective for 
declining to file a motion to suppress challenging Officer Davis' reasonable 
articulable suspicion for the stop. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-12.) Brummett is 
incorrect. Brummett's criminal counsel was not ineffective for declining to file a 
motion to suppress because a motion to suppress would not have been 
successful. Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion to stop Brummett and 
probable cause to arrest Brummett for trespass and resisting and obstructing. 
(See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 1 - p. 8, L. 12).) 
Any motion to suppress would have failed and, therefore the district court did not 
err when it dismissed Brummett's post-conviction petition. 
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8. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. The District Provided Proper Notice Of Its Intention To Dismiss 
Brummett's Petition 
Brummett claims that the district court dismissed his petition without 
providing him proper notice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b).) 
"When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State, 
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted); see also I.C. § 
19-4906(b). The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to 
give the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 
825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 P.2d 
676, 678 (1981). 
Brummett argues that since the "community caretaking" reasoning was 
not discussed in the Conditional Notice of Dismissal, but was used in the 
Memorandum Decision and Order of Dismissal, he was not given proper notice. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) While the district court's order did discuss the 
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community caretaking function, the district court's dismissal was primarily based 
on the finding that Officer Davis had reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Brummett was trespassing and Brummett's counsel was not ineffective for 
refusing to file a motion to suppress. (R., Vol. II, pp. 287-288.) In the 
Memorandum Decision and Order of Dismissal the district court wrote: 
Based on these facts, this Court finds that the arresting officer had 
a reasonable suspicion that petitioner was committing criminal 
activity, particularly when the defendant ran from police. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 288.) The district court's Order of Conditional Dismissal gave 
Brummett notice of the court's intention to dismiss because the officer had 
reason to believe Brummett was trespassing. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 265-274.) 
Brummett does not claim that he was given inadequate notice regarding this 
basis for dismissal. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) Therefore, the district court 
gave Brummett adequate notice of the reason for the dismissal of his petition. 
Even if the notice regarding community caretaking was inadequate, it was 
harmless. If a petitioner is "not left with an 'invisible target' and is able to 
respond in a meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss," 
then any lack of adequate notice is harmless. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 
422-423, 128 P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Franck-Teel v. State, 
143 Idaho 664, 671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-
Teel's response to the state's motion for summary dismissal reveals that she 
understood the basis for dismissal. .. , then we will conclude that the inadequacy 
of notice was harmless error."). Brummett understood the basis for the 
dismissal. Brummett's objection attempted to address whether Officer Davis had 
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reasonable suspicion that Brummett was trespassing. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 279-
284.) This was the primary basis for the dismissal. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 285-
289.) There was no invisible target and any inadequate notice was harmless. 
D. Brummett Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Dismissed His 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
The district court summarily dismissed Brummett's petition for post-
conviction relief because Brummett failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. (R., Vol. II, pp. 265-274, 285-289.) "Idaho Code§ 19-4906 permits a court 
to rule summarily on applications for post-conviction relief." Workman, 144 
Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. "A court may grant the motion of either party 
under I.C. § 19-4906(c), or may dismiss the application sua sponte under I.C. § 
19-4906(b)." kl Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition "is 
appropriate if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." 
kl at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),(c)). "To withstand summary 
dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a 
prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant 
bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,583, 6 P.3d 831,833 (2000)). In 
order to survive summary dismissal of a claim alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the petitioner "must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as 
to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact 
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case." Schoger v. 
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State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
"In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to 
pursue a motion in the underlying criminal action, the court properly may 
consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining 
whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Boman 
v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Huck v. 
State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "Where the 
alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the 
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally 
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test." kl (citing Huck, 124 Idaho 
at 158, 857 P.2d at 637). "If the motion lacked merit and would have been 
denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for failing to pursue it, and, 
concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the want of its 
pursuit." Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-159, 857 P.2d at 637-638. 
Brummett argues that his criminal counsel was ineffective because he did 
not file a motion to suppress. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) He argues that a motion 
to suppress would have likely been granted because there was no reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Brummett was engaged in criminal activity. (R., Vol. I, 
p. 11-12.) Brummett is incorrect. 
Brummett was not seized and his Fourth Amendment rights were not 
implicated until Officer Davis physically seized Brummett and placed him under 
arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (pursuit by police 
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did not constitute a seizure and defendant was not seized until he was tackled); 
State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 590-591, 903 P.2d 752, 755-756 (Ct. App. 
1995). A mere show of authority, where the subject does not submit, does not 
constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Agundis, 127 
Idaho at 590-591, 903 P.2d at 755-756 (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S.at 625). 
Where the subject does not submit, the officer's orders to stop do not constitute 
a seizure and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. lsL. Brummett did not 
submit to Officer Davis' verbal instructions. Brummett was not seized until 
Officer Davis tacked Brummett and placed Brummett under arrest. (See R., Vol. 
II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 13-17).) 
At the time Officer Davis tackled Brummett, Officer Davis had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Brummett and probable cause to arrest Brummett. An 
investigatory stop "is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts 
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 181, 244 
P.3d 1261, 1267 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003)). Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion 
to conduct an investigatory seizure is determined by the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 
(1992). "Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the 
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability." 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). "Reasonable or probable cause is 
the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and 
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prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such 
person is guilty." State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 
(1996) (citation omitted). "Probable cause is not measured by the same level of 
proof required for conviction." kl Probable cause deals with "the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
[persons], not legal technicians, act." kl (citations omitted.) 
At the time Officer Davis tackled Brummett Officer Davis had reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause to believe that Brummett committed the crimes of 
trespass and resisting and obstructing. Officer Davis observed Brummett 
walking on railroad tracks protected by a chain linked, barbed wire fence and 
labeled no trespassing. (See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., 
p. 6, L. 1 - p. 8, L. 12).) 
Q. And when you arrived what did you see? 
A. I observed the defendant, Mr. Brummett walking 
along the railroad tracks, eastbound. He was on the other 
side of a chain linked, barbed wire fence, walking towards 
the train station from 11 th Avenue North. Or 11 th Avenue it 
kind goes from north to south right there. 
Q. Are there any sort of no trespassing signs in that 
area? 
A. On the opposite side there is. The - have observed a 
large no trespassing sign on the east side of 11 th Avenue. 
Q. How about anything on the west side of 11 th Avenue? 
A. I can't honestly say that there's no trespassing signs 
but the chain linked fence and the barbed wire kind of tell 
the story. 
12 
(R., Vol. 11, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-20).) In 2008, the applicable portion of 
the trespass statute stated: 
A. Every person who willfully commits any trespass, by either: 
9. Entering without permission of the owner or the owner's 
agent, upon the real property of another person which real 
property is posted with "No Trespassing" signs, is posted with 
a minimum of one hundred (100) square inches of fluorescent 
orange paint except that when metal fence posts are used, the 
entire post must be painted fluorescent orange, or other notices of 
like meaning, spaced at intervals of not less than one (1) sign, paint 
area or notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along such real 
property; provided that where the geographical configuration of the 
real property is such that entry can reasonably be made only at 
certain points of access, such property is posted sufficiently for all 
purposes of this section if said signs, paint or notices are posted at 
such points of access; or 
Is guilty of a misdemeanor 
I.C. § 18-7008(9) (2008) (emphasis added). Officer Davis knew the railroad area 
where Brummett was walking was marked with a large no trespassing sign and 
protected by a chain link and barbwire fence. (See R., Vol. II, pp. 106-108, 172 
(7/10/08Tr., p. 6, Ls.1-20).) 
This Court can also consider Brummett's flight. Brummett argues that his 
flight, by itself, does not rise to the level of reasonable articulable suspicion for a 
stop. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 
S.Ct. 673 (2000).) However, flight may be considered as one factor in the totality 
of factors to decide reasonable articulable suspicion. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 
125 ("Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and 
investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his 
business or to stay put an remain silent in the face of police questioning"); Padilla 
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v. State, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 7263699, *5 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(the United States Supreme Court had declined to adopt per se rules regarding 
flight, but retained the totality of circumstances analysis when considering 
whether reasonable suspicion existed). 1 One "key" factor is whether the flight 
occurred upon the defendant noticing the police. Padilla, 2014 WL 7263699 *6 
(citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). There is no question that Brummett knew he 
was running from police. He ran from Officer Davis after talking to him. (R., Vol. 
II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 21 - p. 8, L. 17).) Brummett later explained that 
he ran because he did not want the police to find the marijuana in his pocket. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 107.) 
Brummett argued that he was not trespassing because he did not see any 
no trespassing signs and he was able to find an opening in the fence. (R., Vol. 
II, pp. 282-283.) However, for purposes of this reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause analysis, whether Brummett saw a no trespassing sign is 
irrelevant. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause is dependent the 
information possessed by police, not the information possessed by the 
defendant. See White, 496 U.S. at 330; Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 
1223; Julian, 129 Idaho at 136-137, 922 P.2d at 1062-1063. 
Officer Davis knew the Union Pacific had placed a large no trespassing 
sign, he knew the train tracks were protected by a chainlink and barbed wire 
fence, he saw Brummett walking on the train tracks, and he saw Brummett ran 
1 The decision in Padilla is not yet final. The state's petition for review is 
pending. 
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away from him. (See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 6, L. 1 
- p. 8, L. 12).) Officer Davis had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to 
believe that Brummett was trespassing. 
Officer Davis also had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to 
believe that Brummett committed the crime of resisting and obstructing officers. 
Idaho Code§ 18-705 states: 
§ 18-705. Resisting and obstructing officers 
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public 
officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his 
office or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer, 
when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one (1) year. 
I.C. § 18-705.2 After Officer Davis got Brummett's attention, Brummett refused 
to walk to a place where they could talk, ignored Officer Davis instructions and 
fled from Officer Davis. (See R., Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, pp. 107, 172 (7/10/08 Tr., 
p. 6, L. 1 - p. 8, L. 17).) Officer Davis reasonably believed Brummett willfully 
resisted, delayed and obstructed him in the attempted discharge of his duty. 
See ~ State v. Quimby, 122 Idaho 389, 391, 834 P.2d 906, 908 (Ct. App. 
1992) (defendant's flight from police can provide a basis for probable cause to 
arrest for resisting and obstructing). Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest 
Brummett for trespassing and resisting and obstructing. Therefore any 
2 The current version of Idaho Code § 18-705 was in effect in 2008 when 
Brummett was arrested. 
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suppression motion would have failed and the decision to not file such a motion 
was not ineffective assistance of counsel.3 
E. The Search After The Stop Was Not Raised Below And Should Not Be 
Considered On Appeal 
For the first time on appeal, Brummett argues that Officer Davis' search of 
his person was not justified and thus there was no basis for the seizure of 
marijuana that resulted in the arrest. (Appellant's brief, p. 12 (citing Hoffman v. 
State, 153 Idaho 898, 905, 277 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Ct. App. 2012).) This was not 
raised before the district court. (See, R., pp. Vol. II, 267-274, 279-284, 285-289.) 
It is well established that issues not raised below may not be considered for the 
first time on appeal. See M.:. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 
1061, 1062 (1991 ). This Court should decline to consider this issue not raised 
below. 
Even if this Court considers the search, Brummett's argument is not 
supported by the record. Brummett argues that it was Officer Davis' discovery of 
the marijuana which lead to his arrest. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) However, the 
probable cause affidavit submitted by Officer Davis stated that he "placed 
[Brummett] into custody for Resist and Obstruct." (R., Vol. II, p. 107.) At the 
3 As an alternate basis, the district court found that Brummett's detention was 
warranted by the police's community caretaking function. (R., Vol. II, pp. 287-
288 (citing State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004).) Officer 
Davis had reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to arrest Brummett 
and because this decides the issue on appeal, the state will submit the 
community care taking argument on the record below. 
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preliminary hearing, Officer Davis testified that he placed him under arrest before 
he did the pat-down. (See R., Vol. II, p. 172 (7/10/08 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 13-21).) 
Officer Davis' search was justified by several different exceptions, including the 
search incident to arrest (for trespass and obstruct and delay) and a Terry 
protective search for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State 
v. Pedersen, 157 Idaho 790, , 339 P.3d 1194, 1995-1996 (Ct. App. 2014). 
Brummett's new argument is unsupported by the record and law. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
DATED this 31st day of March 2015. 
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